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Auctions have proven to be an ecient economical instrument over the years. 
Since the advent of internet-based commerce, some of their many forms have 
become important. To avoid problems related to the dependence on a central 
entity, distribution of such an instrument is crucial. In this thesis as in general 
Auction Theory, we consider auctions as games. Classifying their rules in two 
sets, we rst study their mechanisms and characterize their relative optimality. 
Then we present a distributed sealed-bid auction protocol and a tie-breaking 
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Veilings is oor die jare heen 'n doeltreende ekonomiese instrument. Sedert die 
koms van internetgebaseerde handel het sommige van hul vele vorme belangrik 
geword. Om probleme te vermy wat verband hou met die afhanklikheid van 'n 
sentrale entiteit, is die verspreiding van so 'n instrument van deurslaggewende 
belang. In hierdie tesis soos in die algemene Veilingteorie, beskou ons veilings 
as speletjies. Ons klassiseer hul reëls in twee stelle, bestudeer hul meganismes 
en kenmerk hulle relatiewe optimiteit. Daarna bied ons 'n verspreide verseëlde 




Firstly, I would like to express my very great appreciation to my supervi-
sor Prof. J. W. Sanders for his invaluable guidance and continuous support
throughout this research project. It has been such a privilege and honour to
have him as an academic father.
Secondly, I would also like to thank my examiners Dr. G. Boxall and Dr. E.
Elkind for their valuable comments and suggestions.
Thirdly, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to AIMS South Africa
and NRF for this opportunity. I thank all the AIMS family for their supports.
Last but not least, I would like to thank my family (Dada sy Neny, Dada,
Manankasina, Rajo sy Mick, Mahery mianakavy, Mihaja sy Andry, Mahenina,
Miangola) and friends for their prayers, love and supports.




Ho an'i Dadabe, ilay naniry ny hahita,
Ho an'i Dada sy i Neny, ireo nikolokolo fatratra,
Ho an'i Rajo kely, izay iriako koa hahavita,












2 Decomposing Auctions 4
2.1 Standard Auctions for a Single Item . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 One Time Bidding Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3 Mechanism Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4 Bid Collection Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.5 Who Knows What When? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.6 Chapter Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3 Mechanism and Valuation Spaces 19
3.1 Mechanisms for Single Item Auctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.2 Valuation Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.3 Maximizing the Total Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.4 Collective Truthful Bidding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.5 Nash Equilibrium Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.6 Chapter Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4 Distributed Sealed-Bid Auctions 29
4.1 Messages in Sealed-Bid Auctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29




4.3 Sealed-Bid Collection Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.4 A Bidder's View of the System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.5 Independence between Bidders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.6 Chapter Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5 Application to Tie Breaking 39
5.1 Valuation Space and Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.2 Sequence of Sealed-Bid Auctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
5.3 Probability for #(M T (v).A)−1({1}) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5.4 Independent of the set A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
5.5 Equivalence Relation on [0,w)2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
5.6 Tie Breaking for a Single Prize . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48






I Set of Items
B Set of Bidders
F Set of Valuations
V Valuation space
M Mechanism space
R Set of Rules
Variables
t Time




b Number of bidders
γ Minimum Gap
w Number of players










The heart of mathematics consists of concrete examples and con-
crete problems. Big general theories are usually afterthoughts
based on small but profound insights; the insights themselves come
from concrete special cases. Paul Halmos [1]
An auction can be viewed as a game. Its players are the bidders who compete
to purchase certain items. It has some rules and at the end an outcome. Most
importantly, as every game should, it has a purpose: to eciently sell or buy
something. Having a clear understanding of what eciency means in that
context, we design the auction game to achieve it.
In designing an auction game, the description should allow us, as designer, to
measure the extent to which our goal is achieved. Used in the eld of Mech-
anism Design, a.k.a. Implementation Theory [2], we have the strategic game
form or extensive game form. In the latter, a set of all possible histories, some
of which mark an end, and a player function determining the turns capture the
evolution of the game. A function dened on the set of all terminal histories
determines the outcome of the game. In the former, the outcome function is
dened on the set of action proles (we always mean by prole a tuple such
that each coordinate corresponds to a unique player) which then completes
the denition of the game in this form. Roger Myerson used this description
in [3]. He called auction mechanism a strategic game together with a function
from the set of bidder's type proles to the set of action proles. When the
actions are exactly the types themselves and the function is the identity, we
have a direct revelation mechanism.
Describing auctions as mechanisms allows us to design the game in a way that
the bidders' Dominant or Nash Equilibrium strategies yield an optimal out-
come for the seller.
Consider eciency in the context of an auction as relative optimality of its
outcome. Then we ask: Can this be measured using the auction mechanism
alone as description?. We certainly cannot tell whether the assumptions re-
quired for an auction mechanism to yield a certain outcome hold or not by
1
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looking at the mechanism itself. Some of them depend on the settings: where
the game is played (indoor? outdoor? online?) and how (centralized? dis-
tributed?).
In the present work, we describe auction games in distributed settings. With
the advent of internet-based commerce, such an auction setting became impor-
tant to support node failures and to avoid a bottleneck that may arise in cen-
tralized systems. Economically, as already proved by the trends of cryptocur-
rencies, a shift away from a centralized entity, which has a certain power on
the market, is desirable. Besides, resource allocation problems in distributed
systems are dealt with auction games (see for example [4]).
For one part of our description, we follow Myerson in using strategic game
forms. Similar to his direct revelation mechanism, our mechanisms are out-
come functions. The dierence is that in [3], the domain consists of valuations
for single items and the range contains pairs of probability (for obtaining the
item) and expected price proles. Here, an outcome is a pair of allocation and
price proles, and as we shall see in Chapter 2, our description overlooks the
nature of items to be auctioned. Hence the theory presented here in general
applies for single and multi-item auctions. By substituting R≥0 with R≤0, it
also applies to reverse auctions [5].
Our notion of mechanism corresponds to the one in Algorithmic Mechanism
Design (survey [6]). As the name suggests, computation and communication
complexity concern the mechanism designer in this area (see for example [7]).
With the tools from Chapter 2, the present work explores truthful mechanisms
as mathematical objects. Their properties presented in Chapter 3 provide us
with insights in dealing with computational problems facing Algorithmic Mech-
anism Design.
The other part of our description of auction games deals with the setting.
Using a model of Knowledge presented in [8], we build in the second half of
Chapter 2 a framework for reasoning about the environment where the auction
game is played. This gives us a more complete view of the dierent forms an
auction might have.
In Chapter 4, we specically treat sealed-bid auctions. To distribute these auc-
tions, we follow Manuel Blum's idea of Commit/Reveal [9]. The interactions
are divided in two phases: rst the information is transmitted without the re-
ceiver being able to access it, and second it is revealed to and checked by this
same receiver. That way, all bids are broadcast in our distributed sealed-bid
auctions so that arbitrators are not needed.
As part of game designing, we deal with ties which may occur in auctions. We
give a protocol for tie breaking in the distributed sealed-bid auction setting in
Chapter 5. The protocol is a solution to the Leader Election Problem which
does not need a specic network topology [10] such as for Herman's Ring [11].
The present work seems to be one of the rst proper treatments of distributed
auctions. Beside this, there are works like [12] and [13] which focus on bid pri-
vacy. For instance in [12], Felix Brandt proposed a cryptographic protocol for
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single-item sealed-bid auctions. It uses El Gamal encryption to allow the bid-
ders computing the auction's outcome jointly, revealing the winning bid to the
winner and the seller alone. The latter feature, which our general sealed-bid
auction protocol doesn't have, follows from the mathematical representation of
bids as boolean vectors whose components are equal to zero apart from those
corresponding to the chosen bid values.
Throughout this document, we make use of Z notation for convenience. As we
shall see, we have various states some of which have several components. Z
allows us to neatly structure complex predicates without unnecessary ordering
or projections. By dening operations with Z, we may focus on the discrete
changes of states they yield and their preconditions without having to worry
about data representations or code related problems. In general for a given
structure, we have the following schema:
NAME OF THE STRUCTURE
LIST OF OBSERVABLES
INVARIANTS




An auction, whether it is live in a room or online, has two particular sets of
rules: one concerning the way bids are collected, another dictating how the
results are computed. For some auctions such as the sealed-bid ones, bidding
and computing the results are done in two dierent stages. For other auctions
like the traditional English auction, there is a sequence of temporary results
changing after each bid. However, in general, these results are computed using
the same function which we refer to as the mechanism.
These two sets of rules divide our study of auctions into two parts. The rst
concerns mechanism design which, regardless of the setting (room or online,
centralized or distributed), consists of nding a suitable rule for computing
the result of an auction game to achieve certain desired outcomes. The second
part covers the bid collection rules which are necessary to ensure that the
conditions required in using a given mechanism are met in a given setting.
Section 2.1 starts this chapter with informal descriptions of some standard
auctions and discussion of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem. In Sections 2.2
and 2.3 we discuss auction mechanism design and dene our mechanism spaces
of interest. In Sections 2.4 and 2.5, we discuss bid collection rules and establish
a framework for studying them in a distributed setting.
2.1 Standard Auctions for a Single Item
There are many forms of auction used to sell several kinds of goods, contracts,
rights, etc. The most common is the traditional English auction. Bidders
are gathered in a room to compete for a certain item. One bids to start the
auction, then they all try to outbid each other. The last bidder who then has
the highest bid wins the item at a price equal to his bid. In a variation of the
English auction, it is the auctioneer, representing the seller, who announces
the price increasingly. The bidders drop out of the auction when they do not
want to bid any higher. Once a bidder has dropped out, he no longer return
to the competition. In this variation, often called ascending auction, the last
4
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active bidder wins the item and pays the price at which the second last bidder
dropped out. Therefore, it is a dominant strategy for a bidder to stay in the
competition until his valuation is exceeded, in both forms. Beyond this value,
he has a negative payo.
The standard Dutch auction is similar to the latter. The auctioneer starts
with a reasonably high bid (as elaborated in Section 2.3) and decreases the
price periodically. The rst bidder to stop the clock and accept to buy the
item at that price wins. It means that only one person bids and concludes the
auction. Hence when the announced price reaches a bidder's valuation, he has
to choose between accepting it with the possibility of winning at a lower price
or waiting for it to drop with the possibility of losing. In other words, there is
no dominant strategy in this auction game. Historically, this form of auction
has been designed in order to sell tulip owers to the highest bidder and in a
short amount of time in the Netherlands.
A family of auction forms where bidding does not involve any (legal) inter-
action between the bidders is the family of sealed-bid auctions. The bids are
submitted in sealed envelops which are opened only at the end. Assuming no
ties, the highest bidder wins the item in all of these auctions but the price he
pays varies. For instance, in First-Price Sealed-Bid (FPSB) auctions, he pays
his own bid whereas in Second-Price Sealed-Bid (SPSB) auctions, he pays the
second highest.
In [16], William Vickrey noted that the dilemmas facing the bidders in tradi-
tional sealed-bid (referring to FPSB) and Dutch auctions are the same. Each
bidder also has to choose between bidding high with the possibility of winning
at a lower price or bidding low with the possibility of losing, in FPSB. Inspired
by this similarity, Vickrey introduced the SPSB auction, a sealed version of
the ascending auction. Indeed, it is a dominant strategy for a bidder to bid
his valuation in SPSB since bidding lower would only decrease his chance of
winning and bidding higher might yield a payment above his valuation. The
pairs FPSB-Dutch and SPSB-ascending auctions are often qualied as strate-
gically equivalent.
Considering the two pairs, Vickrey analysed the expected revenue that each
of these strategic games yields. It turns out that if the bidders' valuations
are drawn from a uniform distribution and if they play in equilibrium, then
the expected revenue is the same for these auctions. Several variations of this
Revenue Equivalence Theorem have risen in the literature (survey in [17]) and
most of them follow from these strategic equivalences.
While this way of studying auctions consists of analysing some given auction
games, it is the inverse of the Mechanism Design problem which we discuss in
the next two sections.
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2.2 One Time Bidding Games
To understand the behaviour of the players (the bidders), we describe auction
games in this section as one time bidding games.
Previously, we described examples of auction game in the simple case of a
single item. Other cases include multiple identical items and combinatorial
auctions (survey in [18]). In the former, bidders bid for blocks of these items
while in the latter, they bid for bundles of complementary items. In general,
the bidders are given multiple choices which, overlooking their nature, we will
still refer to as items. Denoting the set of items in an auction by I, we now
understand that the bidders bid for elements of I.
Suppose we have a nite set B of bidders in an auction for a nite set I of
items. Denote by b the cardinality of B.
Prior to bidding, each bidder i : B obtains random information (a.k.a. signals)
concerning these items and evaluates each element of I. Through that step, i
denes a function vi from I to R≥0 which is then the realization of a certain
random variable, following a distribution over the set F := I → R≥0. In
contrast with general Auction Theory which deals with the random variables
and their distributions (see for examples [16], [3] and [19]), we focus on subsets
of F which contain the supports of these distributions. Specically, we work
on sets of functions, to which the actual valuation prole
v : B → F
i 7→ vi
belongs.
One key component of the auction that each bidder should be aware of prior
to bidding is the mechanism M . Given a valuation prole v , M determines
the outcome of the auction game which consists of an allocation prole
A :B → I⊥
i 7→ Ai
with I⊥ := I ∪ {⊥}, and a price prole
p :B → R≥0
i 7→ pi .
The value Ai indicates the item allocated to bidder i and Ai = ⊥ means that
i wins nothing. For the allocation Ai (even if it is equal to ⊥), i has to pay
the price pi which may contain entrance fee, tax or fraction of his bid as in
All-Pay auctions (see [20]). Note that the Ai 's can be all equal to ⊥ if the
seller's reserve price is not reached in which case he keeps the items unsold.
To avoid double selling, the allocation prole must satisfy certain conditions.
In the case of multiple identical items, the total number of items allocated to
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the bidders should not exceed the number of items to be sold. In combinatorial
auctions, two bundles allocated to dierent bidders should be disjoint. In
general, the feasibility of an allocation prole depends on the resource and the
nature of the items. Let A denote the set of feasible allocations. Then, the
mechanism M can be represented as a partial function:
M : (B → F) 7→ OUTCOME ,




p : B → R≥0
Informed about the mechanismM , every bidder i makes a bid v ′i : F . Following
the Revelation Principle [3], we can assume that the mechanism M is designed
in a way that each bidder i is expected to report his valuation vi . However,
i 's individual goal is to win certain valuable items in the auction at low cost.
Therefore, i rather chooses a bid v ′i in the set Vi ⊆ F of bids available to him,
instead of vi . To make a better choice, i measures his gain from each possible
value of M then computes the set of optimal bids.
If i is allocated an item Ai : I and owes a price pi : R≥0 for it, his gain is the
dierence between his value vi(Ai) for the item and pi . This can be represented
as a function Ui called utility :
Ui : F × I× R≥0 → R
(vi ,Ai , pi) 7→ vi(Ai)− pi .
Since the items allocated to the bidders are somehow related, it is convenient
to capture the utilities across bidders by a utility prole
U : B → ((B → F)×A× (B → R≥0)→ R)
i 7→ ((v ,A, p) 7→ Ui(vi ,Ai , pi)) .
Note that some bidders may have a dierent meaning of the word gain in
reality but for our study, we assume the one proposed above.
Denition 2.2.1 A strategic game is a triple 〈B, (Va,i)i :B, u〉 where B is a set
of players, Va,i is the set of actions player i may take and u :
∏
i :B Va,i → Rb≥0
is a utility prole dened on the set of action proles.
Denition 2.2.2 A strategic game form with consequences in a set C of out-
comes is a triple 〈B, (Va,i)i :B,M 〉 where B is a set of players, Va,i is the set
of actions player i may take and M is a function dened on the set of action
proles which takes its values in C .
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Remark 2.2.3 According to Denition 2.2.1 and Denition 2.2.2 (which are
from [2]), given a strategic auction game form 〈B, (Va,i)i :B,M 〉 (where Va,i is
the set of available bids for i and M is the auction mechanism) and a valuation
prole v : B → F , we obtain the strategic auction game 〈B, (Va,i)i :B, u〉 where
for all v 0 : B → F such that for all i : B, v 0i ∈ Va,i ,
ui(v
0
0 , · · · , v 0b−1) := Ui(v ,M (v 0)).
Since the outcome depends on the entire bid prole, each bidder i : B needs
to consider the other's strategies in deducing his optimal bids. The issue is
that i does not know the exact valuations nor the available bids of his oppo-
nents. What we assume he observes are subsets (Vi ,j )j :B\{i} of F containing
their valuations and available bids. In other words, i does not have the exact
description of the strategic auction game they are playing but he has a strate-
gic auction game form from which he can deduce games whose common set of
action proles contains the one of the actual game.
For any v : B → F , we denote by v−i the function
B \ {i} → F
j 7→ vj .





v−i ,j if j 6= i
v ′i if j = i .
Since v 0 7→ Ui(vi , v−i ,M (v 0)) does not depend on v−i , bidder i only needs to
consider one game corresponding to, say, v = (vi , v−i) with certain
v−i : B \ {i} → F
such that for all j 6= i , v−i ,j ∈ Vi ,j . Therefore, he obtains an optimal bid by
maximizing
v 0 7→ Ui(v ,M (v 0))
over the product∏
j :B
Vi ,j := {v 0 : B → F | ∀ j : B • v 0j ∈ Vi ,j}
where Vi ,i = Va,i is the set of available bids for i .
An alternative in Auction Theory, to address the issue of bidders not knowing
each other's valuation, is to assume that the random variables giving these
valuations have distributions that are known to the bidders. Following [21],
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if a bidder studies some of his potential competitors' bidding patterns in pre-
vious auctions, he can dene an average probability distribution for them.
Having the game dened this way, he maximizes his expected utility instead
of maximizing the function over his set of available bids. From the designer's
perspective, it would be unrealistic to assume that all bidders in a distributed
auction would nd the same probability distribution for their respective oppo-
nents.
2.3 Mechanism Design
Given that the bidders would behave as described in Section 2.2 during an auc-
tion game, the auctioneer should design a strategic auction game form whose
mechanism M would be fair for them and would guarantee maximum prot
to the seller at the same time.
First, the auctioneer should consider each bidder's valuation. The set of avail-
able bid proles must contain the actual valuation prole which, as mentioned
in Remark 2.2.3, will determine the strategic auction game to be played. Like
every bidder, the auctioneer does not know the exact valuation prole but he
can always choose a subset
V ⊆ B → F
that is big enough to contain it. He then denes M on this set which we call
the valuation space.
For instance, in a single-item Dutch auction, the valuation space can be the
product of b copies of a nite list of values; the maximum of these being higher
than the maximum valuation of the bidders. In general, V is not necessarily
symmetric as in that example (by symmetry, we mean Vi = Vj for all i , j : B).
However, assuming symmetry is more practical in the case of a large number
of bidders. Valuation space will be further discussed in Chapter 3.
When dening the mechanism M , a criterion the auctioneer needs to respect
is that every bidder should have non-negative utility by reporting his valua-
tion in the auction. Therefore, he considers only mechanisms which satisfy
Ui(v ,M (v)) ≥ 0 for all v : V and for all i : B. Formally, the mechanism space
which is the set of mechanisms he considers in his design, must be contained
in the set
M(V) := {M : V → OUTCOME | ∀ v : V ,∀ i : B • Ui(v ,M (v)) ≥ 0}.
Since every bidder i would maximize his utility while he is expected to report
his true valuation vi , the auctioneer should choose a mechanism in which vi
would be an optimal bid for i . We qualify such a mechanism as being truthful
or incentive compatible [6], [3].
For instance, the SPSB auction oers an option for selling a single item. The
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mechanism used in this auction allocates the item to the highest bidder who
then pays the runner up's bid. Therefore, the only bid that would maximize the
bidder's utility is exactly his valuation vi unless he colludes with the others.
Note that if the bidders communicate their strategies to each other before
the auction, they can manipulate the bids together in a way that the winning
bidder pays a lower price than the real second highest bid and share the surplus.
To avoid such an event, the auctioneer can simply restrict the mechanism space
to the set
Mu(V) := {M :M(V) | ∀ v : V ,∀ i : B • v ∈ argmax v ′ 7→ Ui(v ,M (v ′))}.
Note that here, v is not required to be the only value for which the maximum
is reached. And in general throughout this document, argmax f is rather a
non-empty subset of dom f than a single element.
If an auction game implements such a mechanism, then the players (individu-
ally and also collectively) have incentive to bid their true valuations assuming
that they are only interested in maximizing their own utilities and not in hiding
their valuations at any cost or in minimizing one another's utilities. Observe
that if
∩i :B argmax v ′ 7→ Ui(v ,M (v ′))
has two or more elements and if the players use v 0 in this intersection that is
not the actual valuation prole v , then each bidder obtains the same utility as
he would for v .
Another alternative for the auctioneer is to assume independence. This is
allowed only because the bids can be made anonymous in online auctions and
the number of bidders on platforms like eBay is large enough. We say that
two bidders i and j are independent if and only if neither of them is certain
about the other's valuation nor bid.
Assuming that the bidders are mutually independent, the auctioneer should
design the auction mechanism in a way that unilateral deviation from truthful
bidding would make the bidder worse o. In other words, he should consider
auction games in which the actual valuation prole is a pure Nash equilibrium
point. Denote by
MN (V) := {M :M(V) | ∀ v : V ,∀ i : B • vi ∈ argmax v ′i 7→ Ui(v ,M (v ′i , v−i))}
the set of such mechanisms.
Finally, assuming that the bidders would report their true valuation, the auc-
tioneer should nd a mechanism which maximizes the total value of the allo-
cations across bidders. Considering the function
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the mechanism space should be contained in
Ms(V) := {M :M(V) | ∀ v : V • M (v).A ∈ argmax A 7→ Ψ(v ,A)}.
Note that the assumption about truthful bidding has allowed the auctioneer
to use such mechanisms to maximize the total value. If the bidders lie about
their valuations, the total value would be dierent. Imagine a single item
FPSB auction with 2 bidders i and j . If i values the item at $400 and j
values it at $300 but they respectively bid $250 and $270, then the mechanism
awards the item to j which means that the allocation made a total value of
$300. Although the mechanism of a FPSB auction awards the item to the
highest bidder, which means that it is in Ms(V), the maximum total value
(which is equal to $400) is not achieved since the bidders did not report their
true value for the item.
For the rest of this document, except Chapter 3, we assume that the valuation
space V is the product∏
i :B
Vi := {v : B → F | ∀ i : B • vi ∈ Vi}
where the Vi 's are xed subsets of F .
2.4 Bid Collection Rules
In Sections 2.2 and 2.3, we assumed that each bidder i observes a collection
(Vi ,j )j :B\{i} of subsets of F containing the true valuations and available bids
of his opponents. This assumption enabled us to dene a strategic auction
game form which has helped in understanding Mechanism Design. However, as
mentioned in the rst paragraph of this chapter and as the examples of Section
2.1 demonstrate, an auction is not a single input/output of the mechanism.
In each of these examples, the protocol for collecting the bids is described, for
it is as important as the mechanism. The interactions between the bidders
and the auctioneer or between the bidders themselves provide them with new
information they can use during the auction. Therefore, the choice of protocol
should match the choice of mechanism to ensure truthful bidding. For instance,
if the mechanism is designed for independent bidders, then the protocol should
not involve interactions that would change this property during bidding. To
analyse such kind of properties in a dynamical setting, we need to formalize
rst the bid collection rules, then the properties in question.
Following the previous sections, each bidder i : B initially has a valuation
vi : Vi and a set Va,i ⊆ Vi of available bids. As the auction evolves, vi or Va,i
might change. Consider for example a bidder i who valued a bundle of violin
and bow for $10, 000 at the beginning of a ve-day auction on eBay then on
the second day, got an acceptable bow from a dierent source. If his intention
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was to have exactly the violin and one bow, his new valuation for the set would
be lower than the initial one. This example is indeed personal but conrms the
possibility of vi changing. It is possible that the bidder simply learned more
about the item during the auction and changed his valuation. For the set Va,i ,
we can consider a single-item English auction. Once a bidder j bids v ′j , any
smaller bid v ′i : Va,i is no longer available hence should be removed from the
set.
In general, there are two ways for communicating the bids: either through
the auctioneer or directly to every other participant (auctioneer/seller and
bidders). Here we opt for the second, to avoid the auctioneer manipulating
the results. In an auction room, this can mean that the bids are called out or
in the case of Sealed-bid auctions, revealed in front of the bidders. For online
auctions, we assume that the bids are broadcast in a message of type OMES
which contains the bidder's identity id and the bid oBid . Note that the letter
O preceding "MES" (short for "message") means open. The reason for this




As we consider distributed auctions, we assume that each bidder i records the
bids he has received or sent in a set oReci : POMES . Moreover, to complete
our view of the global state of an auction, we observe an additional (external)
set aoRec : POMES which contains all messages of type OMES broadcast in
the system.
State[V ]
v : B → F
Va : B → PF
oRec : B → POMES
aoRec : POMES
∀ i : B • vi ∈ Vi ∧ Va,i ⊆ Vi
As captured by the invariant of this schema, the set Va,i of available bids must
be contained in the projection Vi of the valuation space while the valuation vi
may be more general. For instance in a single-item Dutch auction, vi is not
available until the announced price reaches this value.
At the base of what follows are propositions concerning s .vi , s .Va,i , s .oReci
and s .aoRec for all i : B and s : State[V ].
At this point, we can dene any auction by a mechanism aM and a sequence
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aS : seq State[dom aM ] of global states satisfying a certain set of rules. Al-
though we assume that the states change only in nite time, we let aS be
an innite sequence for there is no xed upper bound. Modelling Time by
the set Z, we can assume that bidding starts at certain time t0 before which
advertising and registrations take place. However, as we focus on the changes
of states occurring during the auction, we assume for simplicity that bidding
starts at time t = 0 and consider the set N instead.
The auction form determines the rules which the sequence aS must follow.
However, some of these rules are common to all forms of auction.
Firstly, there is no sent message in the initial state aS [0]:
R0(aS ) := aS [0].aoRec = { }.
Secondly, a message received by a bidder i must have been broadcast:
R1(aS ) := ∀ t : N, ∀ i : B • aS [t ].oReci ⊆ aS [t ].aoRec.
Note that R0 and R1 imply that aS [0].oReci = { } for all i : B.
Thirdly, sending and receiving cannot be undone. Any message broadcast or
received by i at t : N has been respectively broadcast or received by i at any
later time t ′ ≥ t .
R2(aS ) := ∀ t0, t1 : N • (t0 < t1)⇒ (aS [t0].aoRec ⊆ aS [t1].aoRec),
R3(aS ) := ∀ t0, t1 : N, ∀ i : B • (t0 < t1)⇒ (aS [t0].oReci ⊆ aS [t1].oReci).
Lastly, a bidder i cannot submit a bid v ′i unless it is available to him. Therefore,
if a message m : OMES is broadcast, m.oBid must have been available to the
bidder which we qualify by calling that bid valid.
R4(aS ) :=∀ t0 : N,∀m : aS [t ].aoRec,∃ t1 ≤ t0 •
(i = m.id)⇒ (m.oBid ∈ aS [t1].Va,i).
An auction form is given by a mechanism M dened on a valuation space V
and a set R of rules containing {Rk | k ∈ [0, 4]}. An auction of the form
(M ,R) is composed of the mechanism M and a sequence aS : seq State[V ] of
states satisfying the rules in R.
AUC [(M ,R)]
aM :M(V)
aS : seq State[V ]
aM = M
∀R : R • (R(aS )) = true
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 2. DECOMPOSING AUCTIONS 14
2.5 Who Knows What When?
As mentioned in Section 2.4, some sets of bid collection rules allow the bidders
to acquire new information they can use during the game. For instance in
an English auction for single-item, each bidder knows it when he receives
a message. Consequently, he knows that the corresponding bid is valid and
assuming that the bidders always receive a particular message at the same time,
he knows that any smaller bid is no longer available for any of his opponents.
To formalize this intuition as well as similar properties, we use Epistemic and
Temporal Logics [8].
When we dened State[V ] in Section 2.4, we described three elements that are
local to each bidder i , namely his valuation vi , his set Va,i of available bids
and the set oReci of the messages he has received. Consider the equivalence
relation
s0 ∼i s1 if and only if
(s0.vi = s
1.vi) ∧ (s0.Va,i = s1.Va,i) ∧ (s0.oReci = s1.oReci)
on State[V ] for all i : B. Each of these induces an equivalence relation on
AUC [(M ,R)]× N. Specically,
(auc0, t0) ∼i (auc1, t1) if and only if auc0(t0) ∼i auc1(t1).
Following the semantics given in Chapter 4 of [8], we consider the structure
K(M ,R) := (AUC [(M ,R)]× N, π, (∼i)i :B),
where π(auc, t)(P) is the interpretation (true or false) at the point (auc, t) :
AUC [(M ,R)]×N of proposition P concerning valuations or available bids or
bid messages in state s : State[V ]. We dene π by
π(auc, t)(P) := P(auc.aS [t ]),
and write:
(D0) (K(M ,R), auc, t)  P if and only π(auc, t)(P) = true,
(D1) (K(M ,R), auc, t)  ϕ ∧ ϕ′ if and only if
(K(M ,R), auc, t)  ϕ ∧ (K(M ,R), auc, t)  ϕ′,
(D2) (K(M ,R), auc, t)  ¬ ϕ if and only if (K(M ,R), auc, t) 2 ϕ.
For a proposition ϕ, we say that bidder i knows ϕ at a point (auc0, t0) :
AUC [(M ,R)]× N and write
(K(M ,R), auc0, t0)  Kiϕ,
if and only if ϕ holds at any equivalent point (auc1, t1) to i .
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(D3) (K(M ,R), auc0, t0)  Kiϕ if and only if
∀(auc1, t1) ∼i (auc0, t0) • (K(M ,R), auc1, t1)  ϕ.
Before continuing with auction games, let us examine the S5 Properties [8] for
our denition of Knowledge.
 Knowledge Axiom: Since the relation ∼i is reexive, (D3) implies that
(K(M ,R), auc0, t0)  Kiϕ⇒ (K(M ,R), auc0, t0)  ϕ.
This means that if bidder i knows ϕ, then ϕ is true.
 Positive Introspection Axiom: Suppose
(K(M ,R), auc0, t0)  Kiϕ,
and let (auc1, t1) ∼i (auc0, t0). From the transitivity of∼i , any (auc2, t2)
equivalent to (auc1, t1) is also equivalent to (auc0, t0). Hence, we have
(K(M ,R), auc2, t2)  ϕ,
for all (auc2, t2) ∼i (auc1, t1) which means that
(K(M ,R), auc1, t1)  Kiϕ.
Since (auc1, t1) is arbitrary, we have
(K(M ,R), auc0, t0)  KiKiϕ.
This shows that if bidder i knows ϕ, then he knows that he knows ϕ.
 Negative Introspection Axiom: Suppose
(K(M ,R), auc0, t0)  ¬ Kiϕ.
By (D2) and (D3), it means that there exists (auc
1, t1) ∼i (auc0, t0) such
that
(K(M ,R), auc1, t1) 2 ϕ.
Let (auc2, t2) ∼i (auc0, t0). By symmetry and transitivity of ∼i , we
obtain (auc0, t0) ∼i (auc1, t1) and (auc2, t2) ∼i (auc1, t1). Therefore,
(K(M ,R), auc2, t2)  ¬ Kiϕ,
and since (auc2, t2) is arbitrary,
(K(M ,R), auc0, t0)  Ki¬ Kiϕ.
In words, if a bidder i does not know ϕ, then he knows that he does not
know ϕ.
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 Knowledge Generalization Rule: Assume that
(K(M ,R), auc0, t0)  ϕ,
for all (auc0, t0) : AUC [(M ,R)]×N and let (auc1, t1) : AUC [(M ,R)]×N.
For any (auc2, t2) ∼i (auc1, t1), we have
(K(M ,R), auc2, t2)  ϕ.
Hence,
(K(M ,R), auc1, t1)  Kiϕ.
This means that if ϕ is true at any point of AUC [(M ,R)]×N, then any
bidder i knows ϕ at any of these points.
 Consequence Axiom: Suppose
(K(M ,R), auc0, t0)  Kiϕ ∧ Ki(ϕ⇒ ϕ′).
It follows from (D1) and (D3) that
(K(M ,R), auc1, t1)  ϕ and (K(M ,R), auc1, t1)  (ϕ⇒ ϕ′),
for all (auc1, t1) ∼i (auc0, t0). Thus, we have
(K(M ,R), auc1, t1)  ϕ′,
for all (auc1, t1) ∼i (auc0, t0) which means that
(K(M ,R), auc0, t0)  Kiϕ′.
Therefore, if a bidder i knows ϕ and in addition he knows that ϕ′ is a
consequence of ϕ, then he also knows ϕ′.
Looking back at our intuition for single-item English auctions Eng := (ME ,RE ),
as described in the rst paragraph of this section, if we substitute no longer
with not, the property can be written as follows. If a bidder i records a bid
message m at point (auc0, t0), the he knows he received m. Consequently,
he knows that m.oBid is valid (m is in auc0.aS [t0].aoRec) and that any bid
v ′j smaller than m.oBid is not in auc
0.aS [t0].Va,j for all j : B, assuming the
bidders always receive a particular message at the same time. Consider the
propositions
P0(s) := m ∈ s .oReci ,
P1(s) := m ∈ s .aoRec,
P2(s) := ∀ j : B,∀ v ′j ≤ m.oBid • v ′j 6∈ s .Va,j .
Then the following proposition formally states the property we discussed above.
Proposition 2.5.1 Let i : B and m : OMES. Then
(K(Eng), auc0, t0)  P0 ⇒ (K(Eng), auc0, t0)  KiP0,
(K(Eng), auc0, t0)  KiP0 ⇒ (K(Eng), auc0, t0)  (KiP1 ∧ KiP2).
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Proof : By the denition of ∼i and (D3), KiP0 holds whenever P0 does.(
(K(Eng), auc0, t0)  P0 ⇒ (K(Eng), auc0, t0)  KiP0
)
.
Besides, as mentioned in Section 2.4, R1 ∈ RE . Therefore, R1 is satised at
every point (auc1, t1) ∈ AUC [Eng ]×N (meaning that R1(auc1.aS ) holds) and
auc1.aS [t1].oReci is included in auc
1.aS [t1].aoRec. Hence
(K(Eng), auc1, t1)  (P0 ⇒ P1),
for all (auc1, t1) ∈ AUC [Eng ] × N. Applying the Knowledge Generalization
Rule,
(K(Eng), auc1, t1)  Ki(P0 ⇒ P1),
for all (auc1, t1) ∈ AUC [Eng ]×N, and particularly for (auc1, t1) = (auc0, t0).
From the Consequence Axiom, we conclude that
(K(Eng), auc0, t0)  KiP1.
Note that since R1 is part of every auction form, this property holds for them
too.
For the last term of the second inference in our statement, we need to formalize
a proper rule of the single-item English auction. As described in Section 2.1,
the bids in a single-item English auction are increasing. Therefore, when a
bidder receives a bid v ′j , any smaller bid is no longer available for him.
RE ,0(aS ) :=∀ t1 : N,∀ j : B •
m ∈ aS [t1].oRecj ⇒ ∀ t2 ≥ t1,∀ v ′j ≤ m.oBid • v ′j 6∈ aS [t2].Va,i .
The assumption that every bidder receives a message at the same time, can
be written as follows:
∀ t1 : N, ∀ i , j : B • m ∈ aS [t1].oReci ⇔ m ∈ aS [t1].oRecj .
Therefore, if P0 holds at auc1.aS [t1], then m ∈ auc1.aS [t1].oRecj for all j : B.
Hence, RE ,0 implies that P
2 holds at auc1.aS [t1]. Thus,
(K(Eng), auc1, t1)  (P0 ⇒ P2),
for all (auc1, t1) ∈ AUC [Eng ]×N. Using the Knowledge Generalization Rule,
we obtain
(K(Eng), auc0, t0)  Ki(P0 ⇒ P2).
Again, we conclude from the Consequence Axiom.

Recall that before we formalized the latter property, we changed no longer
into not. In order to express our original statement and other properties of
auction games, we consider the temporal operators: 2 (always), 3 (eventu-
ally), © (next time) and U (until). We say that ©ϕ is true if ϕ is true at the
next step and ϕUϕ′ is true if ϕ is true until ϕ′ is true. Following [8], we give
the subsequent denitions.
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(D4) (K(M ,R), auc, t)  ©ϕ if and only (K(M ,R), auc, t + 1)  ϕ.
(D5) (K(M ,R), auc, t0)  ϕUϕ′ if and only if there exists t1 ≥ t0 such that
(K(M ,R), auc, t1)  ϕ′,
and for all t2 : N,
t0 ≤ t2 < t1 ⇒ (K(M ,R), auc, t2)  ϕ.
For a proposition ϕ,3ϕ (ϕ is true in the future) is equivalent to (trueUϕ) and
2ϕ (ϕ is true now and at any later time) is equivalent to the dual ¬3¬ ϕ.
As the sentence any smaller bid is no longer available literary means any
smaller bid is always not available, we now substitute KiP
2 with Ki(2P2).
The denition of RE ,0 allows us to adjust our reasoning and obtain the state-
ment in the rst paragraph of this section. Hence we have the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 2.5.2 Let (auc, t) : AUC [Eng ]×N, i : B and m : OMES. Then,
(K(Eng), auc, t)  P0 ⇒ (K(Eng), auc, t)  Ki(2P2).
2.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have introduced a framework for studying auction games.
The decomposition of the rules into two sets allows us on one hand to study
the bidders' strategies in a static and centralized view while on the other to
reason about the interactions involved in a way that extends to the distributed
setting.
To prepare for distributions of mechanisms, we have considered sets of valua-
tions rather than random variables. By that approach, we can use properties
of these functions to characterize truthful mechanisms in Chapter 3.
While introducing the second part of this framework, we have specically
looked at the example of a distributed English auction. We have established
that in such auctions, the bidders learn about their opponents' available bids
during bidding. In investigating knowledge we have used the approach of
Correspondence Theory to infer laws from semantics properties. As we shall
see in Chapter 4, our approach for describing bid collection rules prove to be
convenient in analysing distributed auctions.
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Mechanism and Valuation Spaces
As mentioned in Section 2.1 to Section 2.3, our approach to studying mecha-
nisms consists of using the properties of valuations as functions.
Since every mechanism is dened on a subset of B → F , we can conduct our
study in two complementary ways. On one side, we x the valuation space
V ⊆ B → F then characterize the set of mechanisms dened on V which sat-
isfy certain predened properties as introduced in Section 2.3. On the other
side, given a mechanism M , we discuss the domain on which certain desired
property holds for M .
In this chapter, we start by giving the underlying mechanisms of the standard
single-item auctions in Section 3.1. Then, we discuss the valuation space in
Section 3.2. In Sections 3.3 and 3.4, we present results concerning Ms(V)
andMu(V) respectively. And in Section 3.5, we discuss the mechanism space
MN (V).
3.1 Mechanisms for Single Item Auctions
Following the decomposition of auctions as introduced in Chapter 2, any of
the standard single-item auctions given in Section 2.1 uses a mechanism in
the family (Mk)k :N∗ subsequently described. Let I = {I } and pk(v) the k -th
maximum bid. Particularly, assuming sucient bids, let
p1(v) := max{vj (I ) : R≥0 | j : B},
and
p2(v) := max ({vj (I ) : R≥0 | j : B} \ {max{vj (I ) : R≥0 | j : B}}) .
Assuming no ties, argmax{vj (I ) | j : B} is a singleton which can be identied
with the bidder it contains. So we dene












pk(v) for i = argmax{vj (I ) | j : B}
0 otherwise.
Note that we do not consider entrance fees or taxes (as mentioned in Section
2.2) in that denition.
For the sealed-bid auctions, it is clear from their denitions which k is used. For
instance, FPSB and SPSB auctions respectively useM1 andM2. Since the only
bidder who bids in a Dutch auction pays this bid, the underlying mechanism is
M1. For English or ascending auctions, their identication with SPSB auctions
(by Vickrey) as introduced in Section 2.1 might be confusing. It is important
to emphasize that the equivalence between them concerns the strategies in
the corresponding games. Recall that we refer to the function for computing
the result as a mechanism. Following the description of English auction, we
have the highest bidder paying his own bid. Therefore, the mechanism used is
M1.
3.2 Valuation Space
As introduced in Section 2.3, a valuation space is a domain on which the auc-
tion mechanism is dened. In that section, we mentioned that the auctioneer
can always choose one that is big enough to contain the prole of bidders'
valuations. This freedom follows from Proposition 3.2.1 which states that if
the property (among those cited in Section 2.3) he wants the mechanism to
satisfy holds on a set V , then it also holds on any subset of V .
Proposition 3.2.1 Let V0 ⊆ V1 ⊆ B → F . Then,
{M|V0 | M :M(V1)} ⊆ M(V0),
{M|V0 | M :Ms(V1)} ⊆ Ms(V0),
{M|V0 | M :Mu(V1)} ⊆ Mu(V0),
{M|V0 | M :MN (V1)} ⊆ MN (V0).
Proof :
 Let M : M(V1) and let v : V0. Then v ∈ V1 and for all i : B,
Ui(v ,M (v)) ≥ 0. Therefore, M|V0 ∈M(V0).
 Similarly, let M :Ms(V1) and let v : V0. Then v ∈ V1 and for all i : B,
M (v).A ∈ argmax A 7→ Ψ(v ,A). Therefore, M|V0 ∈Ms(V0).
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 Let M :Mu(V1), v : V0 and i : B. Since V0 ⊆ V1, we have
Ui(v ,M (v
′)) ≤ Ui(v ,M (v))
for every v ′ : V0. It follows that v ∈ argmax v ′ 7→ Ui(v ,M (v ′)) and
M|V0 ∈Mu(V0).
 Similarly, let M :MN (V1) , v : V0 and i : B. Since V0 ⊆ V1,
Ui(v ,M (v
′
i , v−i)) ≤ Ui(v ,M (vi , v−i)),
for every v ′i ∈ V0i . Therefore, vi ∈ argmax v ′i 7→ Ui(v ,M (v ′i , v−i)) and
M|V0 ∈MN (V0).

Having Proposition 3.2.1, we might be tempted to simply consider B → F as
valuation space. However, we are dealing with maximization problems and we
need to ensure the existence of a solution, specically an optimal mechanism
M dened on this valuation space.
Note that for the space Ms(V), the maximization is over the nite set A of
allocation proles for a xed valuation prole v ∈ V . Therefore, the existence
of such a mechanism does not depend on the non-empty set V .
ForMu andMN , the mechanisms are solutions of the systems of inequalities
Ui(v ,M (v).A,M (v).p) ≥ Ui(v ,M (v ′).A,M (v ′).p),∀ i : B, ∀ v , v ′ : V ,
and
Ui(v ,M (v).A,M (v).p) ≥ Ui(v ,M (v ′i , v−i).A,M (v ′i , v−i).p), ∀ i : B,∀ v : V ,∀ v ′i : Vi ,
respectively. Note that the constant mechanism which always allocates ⊥ to
every bidder at a price equal to zero is a solution to both systems although it
is not an optimal mechanism.
Recall that F is the set of non-negative real-valued functions on a nite set
I and B is a nite set of bidders. Therefore, we can identify B → F with
Rb×#I≥0 and use an induced topology from Rb×#I. Particularly, we can consider
the l1-distance which is the sum of the dierences across coordinates. In our
notation, the distance is dened by





∣∣v 0i (I )− v 1i (I )∣∣
for all v 0, v 1 : B → F . From now on, we assume that the valuation space is a
compact subset of the metric space (B → F , d).
As there are nitely many items, the range of a valuation vi : F of a bidder i
is nite. If it is not a singleton, then there exists a minimum distance (strictly
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positive) between its elements. Fixing a lower bound for such minimum dis-
tance, we restrict our attention to valuations which assign to two dierent
items a multiple of 2bγ for a given γ > 0. Let
Fγ := {v : B → F | ∀ i : B,∀ I 0, I 1 : I,∃ k ∈ N •
∣∣vi(I 0)− vi(I 1)∣∣ = 2bkγ}.
(3.2.1)
For the rest of this chapter, the open balls we refer to are those of (Fγ, d),
namely
B(v 0, r) := {v 1 : Fγ | d(v 0, v 1) < r},
for r > 0 and v 0 : Fγ.
3.3 Maximizing the Total Value
As mentioned in Section 2.3, one of the auctioneer's goals is to maximize the
total true value yielded by the allocations across bidders. While he cannot
access their true valuations, he can design a mechanism which maximizes the
total value at any bid prole. That is our denition ofMs(V). Using such a
kind of mechanism, the goal is achieved when every bidder bids truthfully.
For a single item, every mechanism in the family (Mk)k :N∗ introduced in Sec-
tion 3.1 satises the condition of Ms and the only computation required is
to nd the maximum bid which is a real number. Moreover, in some auction
forms like the English or Dutch auctions, the bids are already sorted during
collection. The case of multi-item auctions, either identical items or combina-
torial, is more complicated in terms of computation. The diculty arises from
the restriction on feasibility of allocations on top of the valuation space's high
dimensionality. While such computational problems are already addressed in
the eld of Algorithmic Mechanism Design (see for example [6]), insights from
mathematical properties of the valuation space can be useful as we shall see.
As mentioned in Section 3.2, we assume that the valuation space V is com-
pact. Therefore, we have a nite cover with open balls of radius γ. If we can
dene simple and optimal mechanisms on each of these open balls, then our
problem is reduced to glueing them together to obtain a simple and optimal
mechanism on V . For instance, if we can dene a mechanism on each open
ball by taking a constant allocation prole which maximizes the total value at
each bid prole, then the remaining task to obtain a mechanism M on V is
to choose the values of M on the intersections of the balls. Proposition 3.3.1
states that the total values from any two valuation proles which are close to
each other by γ have the same maximizers.
Proposition 3.3.1 Let v 0 : Fγ and v 1 : B(v 0, γ). Then,
argmax A 7→ Ψ(v 0,A) = argmax A 7→ Ψ(v 1,A).
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Proof : Let A0 : argmax A 7→ Ψ(v 0,A) and A1 : A. There are two cases to
consider.




















i )− 2bkγ. (3.3.1)
Besides, since d(v 0, v 1) < γ, for all i : B and for all I : I,
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Thus, A0 ∈ argmax A 7→ Ψ(v 1,A) and
argmax A 7→ Ψ(v 0,A) ⊆ argmax A 7→ Ψ(v 1,A).
By symmetry, we also have
argmax A 7→ Ψ(v 1,A) ⊆ argmax A 7→ Ψ(v 0,A).

Note that the existence of a minimum gap 2bγ in the valuations plays an
important role in this proof.
From Proposition 3.3.1, if the distance between two balls (minimum distance
between their elements) is smaller than γ, then any two valuation proles v 0
and v 1 in their union also satisfy the equality
argmax A 7→ Ψ(v 0,A) = argmax A 7→ Ψ(v 1,A).
Hence, the set valued function
v 7→ (argmax A 7→ Ψ(v ,A))
is constant on every connected component of V . Particularly, it is constant on
V if V is convex.
3.4 Collective Truthful Bidding
In Section 2.3, we dened the mechanism spaceMu(V) whose elements ensure
truthful bidding when the bidder's goal is to maximize only his own utility.
With these mechanisms, even if the bidders communicate their strategies to
each other, they still have incentive to bid their true valuation prole v as
their utilities (which are their respective maximum utilities) are the same as
they would get for any other bid prole in
∩i :B argmax v ′ 7→ Ui(v ,M (v ′)).
Moreover, Proposition 3.4.1 states that with a mechanism M in Mu(V), no
matter what the valuation prole, when bidder i is allocated the same item,
he has to pay the same price.
Proposition 3.4.1 Let V ⊆ Fγ and M :Mu(V). For a bidder i : B and for
every two valuation proles v 0, v 1 : V,
M (v 0).Ai = M (v
1).Ai ⇒ M (v 0).pi = M (v 1).pi .
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Proof : Suppose M (v 0).Ai = M (v
1).Ai . Since M ∈Mu(V), we have
v 0 ∈ argmax v ′ 7→ Ui(v 0,M (v ′)),
which implies that:
v 0i (M (v
0).Ai)−M (v 0).pi ≥ v 0i (M (v 1).Ai)−M (v 1).pi .
It follows that M (v 0).pi ≤ M (v 1).pi .
By symmetry, we also have M (v 1).pi ≤ M (v 0).pi .

Consequently, if M assigns the same allocation prole to every bid prole in
∩i :B argmax v ′ 7→ Ui(v ,M (v ′)),
then every bidder pays the same price to maximize his utility. Hence, the seller
earns the same revenue.
Furthermore, Proposition 3.4.2 shows that if a bid prole is close to v with a
distance less than γ (the minimum gap as introduced in Section 3.2), then the
mechanism M does not have to assign the same allocation prole as does v
to this bid prole to yield the same revenue to the seller. If M maximizes the
total value and ensures collective truthful bidding at the same time, then the
seller's revenue is constant on any open ball B(v 0, γ) with v 0 : V .
Proposition 3.4.2 Let v 0 : V and M :Ms(B(v 0, γ))∩Mu(B(v 0, γ)). Then,
for all v 1 : B(v 0, γ), ∑
i :B
M (v 1).pi =
∑
i :B
M (v 0).pi .
Proof : Let v 1 : B(v 0, γ). Since M ∈Mu(B(v 0, γ)), for all i : B
v 1i (M (v
1).Ai)−M (v 1).pi ≥ v 1i (M (v 0).Ai)−M (v 0).pi .
By summing over B, we obtain∑
i :B




M (v 1).pi ≥
∑
i :B




M (v 0).pi .
From Proposition 3.3.1,M ∈Ms(B(v 0, γ)) implies thatM (v 1).A andM (v 0).A
are in
argmax A 7→ Ψ(v 1,A) = argmax A 7→ Ψ(v 0,A).
Therefore, ∑
i :B




v 1i (M (v
0).Ai),
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and ∑
i :B
M (v 1).pi ≤
∑
i :B









Analogous to the extension of Proposition 3.3.1, the latter proposition also
extends to any connected component of V ; hence it holds for any two points
of V if V is convex.
3.5 Nash Equilibrium Mechanisms
An alternative introduced in Section 2.3 is the use of Mechanisms for which
the actual valuation prole is a pure Nash Equilibrium point. In some cases,
it gives more choices of mechanisms than the one described in Section 3.4.
Since all inequalities in the denition of MN (V) are also part of those for
Mu(V), we have Mu(V) ⊆ MN (V) for any convex subset V ⊆ Fγ. This
inclusion can be strict. As stated in the following example, the single item
Second-Price mechanism M2 is in the dierence of the two sets.








As discussed in Section 2.1, bidding the true valuation is a best response for
any bidder if every other bidders do the same. To see why M2 is not in
Mu(
∏b−1
i=0 [0, αi ]), it is enough to consider the valuation prole
v : i : B 7→ αi : R>0.
The bid prole
v ′ : i : B 7→ αi − ε : R>0,
where min{αi | i : B} > ε > 0 yields a higher utility to the winner.
An example where the standard mechanismM1 is inMN (V) but not inMu(V)
with V being not connected is given below.
Example 3.5.2 Let i : B and αi , βi : R≥0 such that αi < βi . Consider
Vαi ,βi := ([0, αi [i−1×{αi} × [0, αi [b−i) ∪ ([αi , βi [i−1×{βi} × [αi , βi [b−i).
Then, M1 ∈MN (Vαi ,βi ) and M1 6∈ Mu(Vαi ,βi ).
In this case, it is a best response for a bidder to bid truthfully if everyone else
does the same. However, if bidder i has the value βi , then he would increase
his utility if they all bid lower than αi .
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Since the kind of mechanism in question in this section does not guarantee
truthful bidding unless the bidders are independent, the bid collection rules
that should accompany them must preserve the independence, which we as-
sume holds initially, while the bidders are allowed to bid.
We saw in Chapter 2 that a bidder i 's valuation can change naturally from
one state to the next in an auction. Following our comment in Section 2.1
concerning its origin (being a realization of a certain random variable), we
now can think of the sequence of changes in vi as a path of a certain stochastic
process. Given a set of available bids at a time t , i chooses his bid according to
his valuation at that time and to what he knows about his opponents. Hence
if we think of his bid at time t + 1 as given by a random variable, then we can
say that it depends on the random variable giving his valuation at time t . As
for its relation to the other bidders' valuations (at t) or bids (at t + 1), as-
sumptions on independence are needed. At least, we should assume something
about the random variables giving the the bidders' valuations. For instance
in the literature, there are the Independent Value Model, the Common Value
Model and the Aliated Value Model as surveyed in [17]. Our approach using
the sets Va,i 's avoids such assumptions.
Although we consider xed sets of available bids, we do not eliminate the de-
pendence on chance [22]. Recall that in Section 2.3, we informally dened
the statement i and j are independent by none of them is certain about
the other's valuation nor bid. When each bidder has more than two avail-
able strategies (may be innite), we assume that they can freely choose any.
In that case, no bidder has control of the other's bid and we have mutual
independence when no bidder knows the other's valuation. In John Nash's
terminology as in [23], we can say that each bidder thinks of his opponent's
strategy as mixed (a convex combination of his available strategies).
If bidder j has a single available strategy, then i is independent of j  should
mean that i does not know j 's strategy nor his valuation. Following Section
2.5, we dene independence as follows. We say that i is independent of j in
state s : State[V ] and we write iI(s)j if and only if
iI(s)j :¬ Ki(s .vj ) ∧ (Ki(s .Va,j )⇒ #s .Va,j > 1) .
By the denition of Ki given in Section 2.5, each bidder knows his own valu-
ation and available bids. Hence the relation I(s) is irreexive for every state
s : State[V ].
Moreover, if i is uncertain about j and j about k , it does not necessarily mean
that i is uncertain about k . Especially, i is not independent of himself whether
or not there exists another bidder j with whom he is mutually independent.
Assuming that all bidders are independent of each other at a state s : State[V ],
we have I(s) symmetric. It follows that I(s) is not transitive.
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3.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have explored the properties of valuation spaces to obtain
insights for the mechanism spaces. We have seen that if the valuation space is
convex and compact in (Fγ, d), then the set of allocation proles that maxi-
mize the total value is the same for every prole in that space. It means that
once such a space is dened, any additional optimization can be done over that
common set of allocation proles.
We have proved that if the mechanism dened on a compact convex valuation
space ensures collective truthful bidding, then the price it assigns for a par-
ticular allocation is xed regardless of the valuation prole. If in addition its
allocation proles maximize the total value, then the seller's revenue is con-
stant on the valuation space. These characterizations show the availability of
truthful mechanisms that are relatively simple.
Finally, we have discussed a mechanism space which uses the concept of Nash
Equilibria. We have dened a notion of independence which is required in
using such mechanism. For this, we have assumed that a bidder is free to
chose any of his many available bids (when it is the case). It prevents a bidder
from being sure that another bidder he colludes with would not break their
agreement if the latter has two or more available bids. In Chapter 4, we will




The success of auction platforms like eBay using combinations of open and
sealed-bid auctions is well-known. While such a combination is promoted [24],
in this chapter we focus on distributing sealed-bid auctions. We consider the
auctioneer/seller as a special kind of bidder who bids his reserve price.
In Sections 4.1 and 4.2, we describe how the bids are communicated and how
the results are computed. In Section 4.3, we formalize the rules guiding these
operations while in Sections 4.4 and 4.5, we discuss the consequences of these
rules from a bidder's perspective.
4.1 Messages in Sealed-Bid Auctions
Translating the rules of a sealed-bid auction room, the bids in distributed
sealed-bid auctions should be submitted in some sealed form and opened
only when the bidding is over. Following Section 2.4, there is no auctioneer
who keeps the envelops and opens them at the end. Instead, every bidder
commits his bid during the bidding time which ends according to the partici-
pant's cooperative decision, then reveals it when the bidding time is over.
In Section 2.4, we described a type OMES of messages containing the bidder's
identity id : B and his bid oBid : F which are used here to reveal a bid. For
committing it, we consider another type SMES of messages which play the
role of sealed envelops. Such a message contains an encrypted value of the bid
it represents, the one-way function used to encrypt the bid and the identity of
the bidder.
As we shall see in the example of Chapter 5, the set of all possible bid can
be relatively small. In that case, access to the one-way function would give a
bidder access to the others' actual bids. To encounter this problem, we can
replace the one-way function in the SMES message by its own encryption.
Alternatively, we can extend the set of bids in a way that it is large enough
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Denote by E the space of encrypted bids and by G the space of one-way func-









In this description of OMES , we added the encrypted bid sBid to link the
opened envelop with the sealed one. When a bidder prepares a bid, he
writes two messages: sm : SMES and om : OMES to commit and reveal
the bid respectively. Therefore, both messages contain his identity and the
encrypted bid sm.sBid which he obtained by computing sm.seal(om.oBid).






sm.sBid = om.sBid = sm.seal(om.oBid)
Being allowed to change his bid during the appropriate time, each bidder i has
a sequence uReci : seqUREC recording the corresponding pairs of messages
to all his previous bids.
4.2 Operations in Sealed-Bid Auctions
When a bidder i executes any operation (committing or revealing a bid, reading
a sealed or opened bid, computing the result or transacting), the name of
that operation is noted in a sequence fHisti : seq STRING . It is important
to emphasize that fHisti is not intended to record the history of the auction
(which is the purpose of aS ) but to monitor the use of these operations in order
to locally separate the three phases of the auction: committing, revealing and
computing.
The bids are committed by broadcasting their sealed forms. Each bidder i
records the sealed bid messages he receives or sends in a set sReci : P SMES .
The two following schemas summarize the operations SealBid and SRead which
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rec.sm = m! ∧ m!.id = i
sRec ′i = sReci ∪ {m!}
uRec ′i = uReci
a 〈rec〉




mSet? : P SMES
sRec ′i = sReci ∪mSet?
fHist ′i = fHisti
a 〈“SRead”〉
Similarly and as introduced in Section 2.4, each bidder records the open bid
messages he receives or sends in a set oReci : OMES during the revealing





oRec ′i = oRec ∪ {m!}





oRec ′i = oReci ∪mSet?
fHist ′i = fHisti
a 〈“ORead”〉
Note from the OpenBid operation's description that only the last bid is re-
vealed for every bidder. All preconditions for these operations as well as for
those which follow are given in Section 4.3 as they are part of the collection
rules.
Assuming that the broadcasts succeed and that there is at most one open bid
per bidder, every participant acquires the same bid prole v : B → F at the
end of the revealing phase. If some bidders did not reveal their bids, each
missing valuation is set to be the constant function equal to zero which is sim-
ply denoted by λ I : I • 0. Since the bidders also have the auction mechanism
M , assuming that they all have the computational power, each of them can
compute the result and update the observable resi : OUTCOME .
Results
∆SBState[V ]
v : B → F
∀m : oReci • v(m.id) = m.oBid
∀ i : B \ {m.id | m ∈ oReci} • v(i) = λ I : I • 0
res ′i = M (v)
fHist ′i = fHisti
a 〈“Results”〉
The seller, considered as a special bidder, particularly has the result under
these assumptions. The transaction as well as the registration process are
outside the scope of the present document.
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4.3 Sealed-Bid Collection Rules
Following the previous description of the sealed-bid auctions, we see that the
set {Rk | k ∈ [0, 4]} is a proper subset of the set RS of their collection rules.
Before we give the extra rules, let us modify the denition of auction global
states to include information about the sealed bid messages as well as the
performed operations and the result.
In addition to the local observables described in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 and to
the observables introduced in Chapter 2, we dene a set asRec : P SMES of
sealed bid messages that are broadcast in the system. In other words, asRec
is to the committing phase the same as aoRec is to the revealing phase. The
global state of a sealed-bid auction is summarized in the following schema.
SBState[V ]
v : B → F
Va : B → PF
sRec : B → P SMES
oRec : B → POMES
uRec : B → seqUREC
res : B → OUTCOME
fHist : B → seq STRING
asRec : P SMES
aoRec : POMES
∀ i : B • vi ∈ Va,i ∧ Va,i ⊆ Vi
∀ i : B,∀ k : dom uReci • uReci [k ].sm ∈ oReci
Note that while in the general denition of State[V ], the valuation vi of bid-
der i is required only to be in the projection Vi of the valuation space, for
SBState[V ], it is necessarily an available bid. Also note from the second line
in the invariants of SBState[V ] that the only way to add a record rec : UREC
to uReci is through the operation SealBid .
Analogous to the rules in {Rk | k ∈ [0, 3]} which concern open bid messages,
we have the four rst proper rules of sealed-bid auctions.
Firstly, the set of broadcast sealed bid messages is initially empty.
RS ,0(aS ) := aS [0].asRec = { }.
Secondly, a sealed bid message received by any bidder i must have been broad-
cast.
RS ,1(aS ) := ∀ t : N, ∀ i : B • aS [t ].sReci ⊆ aS [t ].asRec.
As R0 and R1 imply that aS [0].oReci is empty, RS ,0 and RS ,1 also imply that
aS [0].sReci is. Thirdly, since sending and receiving cannot be undone, a sent
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or received sealed bid message remains in this status throughout the rest of
the auction.
RS ,2(aS ) := ∀ t0, t1 : N • (t0 < t1)⇒ (aS [t0].asRec ⊆ aS [t1].asRec)
RS ,3(aS ) := ∀ t0, t1 : N,∀ i : B • (t0 < t1)⇒ (aS [t0].sReci ⊆ aS [t1].sReci).
Apart from R0 and RS ,0, we have two more initialization rule. The observable
resi : OUTCOME that changes after running the Results operation is initially
set to be the outcome which has a constant allocation prole equal to ⊥ and
a constant price prole equal to 0. Denote it by (⊥, 0).
RS ,4(aS ) := ∀ i : B • aS [0].resi = (⊥, 0).
For the sequences uReci and fHisti , we set them initially empty by the following
rule:
RS ,5(aS ) := ∀ i : B • aS [0].uReci = 〈 〉 ∧ aS [0].fHisti = 〈 〉.
As described in Section 4.2, the sequence fHisti of operation names follows
some rules to locally separate the phases. First, a bidder can never read any
open bid message before committing his own bid. This rule notes the key
feature of sealed-bid auction games.
RS ,6(aS ) :=∀ t : N, ∀ i : B,∀ k , l ∈ dom(aS [t ].fHisti) •
(aS [t ].fHisti [k ] = “SealBid” ∧ l ≤ k)⇒ aS [t ].fHisti [l ] 6= “ORead”.
The next rule says that once a bidder reveals his last bid, he no longer can
commit a dierent bid:
RS ,7(aS ) :=∀ t : N, ∀ i : B,∀ k , l ∈ dom(aS [t ].fHisti) •
(aS [t ].fHisti [k ] = “SealBid” ∧ l ≤ k)⇒ aS [t ].fHisti [l ] 6= “OpenBid”.
Note that this rule ensures that the valuation prole the bidders obtain at the
end of the sealed-bid auction is well dened.
With the two last rules, if a bidder does not read or send any open bid message,
then he can still commit a bid. Therefore, if by any means he accesses the
other's open bid, then he gains the privilege to bid properly. To ensure that
no bidder has an incentive to seek for an outside source, we impose a rule
saying that after a bidder has read an open bid message, he no longer reads
any sealed bid message:
RS ,8(aS ) :=∀ t : N,∀ i : B, ∀ k , l ∈ dom(aS [t ].fHisti) •
(aS [t ].fHisti [k ] = “SRead” ∧ l ≤ k)⇒ aS [t ].fHisti [l ] 6= “ORead”.
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In addition, a bidder cannot perform any of the bidding operations after com-
puting the result:
RS ,9(aS ) :=∀ t : N, ∀ i : B,∀ k , l ∈ dom(aS [t ].fHisti) •
(aS [t ].fHisti [k ] = “Results” ∧ l > k)⇒
aS [t ].fHisti [l ] 6∈ {“SealBid”, “SRead”, “OpenBid”, “ORead”}.
Note that we could write the rules for separating the bidding phases using
asRec and aoRec. But as they are not clear from the operations, it is convenient
to use fHisti .
Now, we have RS = {Rk | k ∈ [0, 4]} ∪ {RS ,k | k ∈ [0, 9]}.
Following RS ,6,RS ,7 and RS ,9, since the operation SealBid appends the string
“SealBid” to fHisti , the strings “ORead”, “OpenBid” and “Results” must not
be in the range of fHisti as a precondition for SealBid . Since adding elements
to uReci or sReci has no condition, there is no other precondition for SealBid :
pre SealBid
SBState[V ]
“ORead”, “OpenBid”, “Results” 6∈ ran(fHisti)
Similarly, since “SRead” is added to fHisti during SRead , the rules RS ,8 and
RS ,9 implies that the strings “ORead” and “Results” must not be in the range
of fHisti to run the operation. As the change for sReci in the operation is the
addition of some elements, we only have the previous precondition:
pre SRead
SBState[V ]
“ORead”, “Results” 6∈ ran(fHisti)
Note that it is possible that “OpenBid” ∈ ran(fHisti).





For the OpenBid operation, since the message to send should come from the se-
quence uReci , this sequence must be non-empty as a precondition for OpenBid .
Therefore, we also have “SealBid” ∈ ran(fHisti). As for the other bidding op-
erations, RS ,9 implies that the string “Results” should not be in ran(fHisti):
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uReci 6= 〈 〉
Although RS ,6 to RS ,9 are dened to separate the phases, they do not imply
that each of these three phases exists locally. Furthermore, they do not allow
us to infer the existence of an earlier phase given a later one. Particularly,
since the Results operation does not require oReci or fHisti to be non-empty,
it can be performed without any preceding bidding phase according to the
rules.
4.4 A Bidder's View of the System
As we added more observables to the local states, we now need to discuss
the denitions of the equivalence relations ∼i given in Section 2.5. Keeping
the meaning of these relations the same, we say that two global states s0, s1 :
SBState[V ] are equivalent for bidder i if his local states in s0 and s1 are the
same. Specically, we write s0 ∼′i s1 if and only if
s0.sReci = s
1.sReci ∧ s0.oReci = s1.oReci ∧ s0.uReci = s1.uReci
∧ s0.fHisti = s1.fHisti ∧ s0.vi = s1.vi ∧ s0.Va,i = s1.Va,i .




that s0.resi = s
1.resi as the string “Results” must be either the last element
of s0.fHisti or not in its range at all.
Since ∼′i are again equivalence relations, we have all the concepts and proper-
ties introduced in Section 2.5. Given the mechanismM of a sealed-bid auction,
we consider the structure K′(M ,RS ).
In Section 2.4 while dening R4, we said that when an open bid message is
broadcast, we qualify the bid as valid. But before it can be broadcast, R4
states that the bid must be available to the bidder. Moreover, the denition
of OpenBid implies that any bidder i 's open bid is recorded in the sequence
uReci . Since the recording of the pairs of bid messages is done in the oper-
ation SealBid , any valid open bid must have been committed. Dening the
proposition
P3(s) :=∀ om : s .aoRec • ∃ sm : s .asRec •
sm.id = om.id ∧ sm.sBid = om.sBid = sm.seal(om.oBid),
we have
(K′(M ,RS ), auc, t)  P3
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for all (auc, t) : AUC [(M ,RS )] × N. If we are to allow message delay, the
local sets sReci and oReci might not have similar property as P
3. However,
following R1, if a bidder receives an open bid message om : OMES at (auc, t),
then this open bid must have been committed. Writing
P4(s) :=∀ om : s .oReci • ∃ sm : s .asRec •
sm.id = om.id ∧ sm.sBid = om.sBid = sm.seal(om.oBid),
we also have
(K′(M ,RS ), auc, t)  (∀ i : B,P4)
at any point (auc, t) : AUC [(M ,RS )]×N. From the Knowledge Generalization
Rule, we see that each bidder i knows that any open bid he receives has been
committed:
∀(auc, t) : AUC [(M ,RS )]× N,∀ i : B • (K′(M ,RS ), auc, t)  KiP4.
Note that this result does not depend on the equations in the denition of ∼′i .
Since sReci contains sealed bid messages whose contents do not serve i in his
decision on a new bid as fHisti and uReci do not, we can remove the equations
concerning these observables and get the equivalence relation ∼i back. Recall
that s0 ∼i s1 if and only if
s0.oReci = s
1.oReci ∧ s0.vi = s1.vi ∧ s0.Va,i = s1.Va,i .
To summarize, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4.4.1 Consider the equivalence relation ∼i for all i : B and let
K(M ,RS ) be the corresponding structure. Then,
(K(M ,RS ), auc, t)  KiP4
for all point (auc, t) : AUC [(M ,RS )]× N and for any bidder i : B.
4.5 Independence between Bidders
As mentioned in Section 3.5, some important mechanisms (including the single
item standard ones like M1 and M2) need to be used with bid collection rules
that preserve independence while the bidders are allowed to bid. Referring
to the previous sections, this means that independence should hold until the
bidders no longer can seal a bid for the sealed-bid auction form to be compatible
with these mechanisms. Let M be such mechanism.
Assume that the bidders are mutually independent at the beginning of a sealed-
bid auction auc : AUC [(M ,RS )]. Formally, assume that
(K(M ,RS ), auc, 0)  (∀ i , j : B • (i = j ) ∨ iIj ).
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Each bidder i : B does not know the exact valuation of any other bidder
j : B \ {i} nor his single available bid if it is the case. By denitions (D3) and
(D2), the rst part concerning j 's valuation means that there exists a point
(auci ,j ,0, t i ,j ,0) : AUC [(M ,RS )]× N such that
 (auci ,j ,0, t i ,j ,0) ∼i (auc, 0) and
 auci ,j ,0.aS [t i ,j ,0].vj 6= auc.aS [0].vj .
The second part means that if for every point (auci ,j ,1, t i ,j ,1) : AUC [(M ,RS )]×
N equivalent to (auc, 0) with respect to ∼i
auci ,j ,1.aS [t i ,j ,1].Va,j = auc.aS [0].Va,j ,
then #auc.aS [0].Va,j > 1.
Let t : N be a time when bidder i can still seal a bid in the next step. Then,
from the precondition of SealBid ,
“ORead”, “OpenBid”, “Results” 6∈ ran(auc.aS [t ].fHisti).
Therefore,
auc.aS [t ].oReci = auc.aS [0].oReci
= auci ,j ,1.aS [t i ,j ,1].oReci
for any point (auci ,j ,1, t i ,j ,1) : AUC [(M ,RS )] × N equivalent to (auc, 0) with
respect to ∼i .
As mentioned before, no operation in a sealed-bid auction changes i 's valuation
or set of available bids but they might change naturally. Since they are the
same in auc.aS [0] and auci ,j ,1.aS [t i ,j ,1] for any point (auci ,j ,1, t i ,j ,1) ∼i (auc, 0),
these external changes can occur in any of these states. Hence we can con-
struct a point in AUC [(M ,RS )] × N from any (auci ,j ,1, t i ,j ,1) ∼i (auc, 0) in
a way that preserves every observables apart from vi and Va,i which are set
equal to auc.aS [t ].vi and auc.aS [t ].Va,i respectively.
If auc.aS [t ].vj = auc.aS [0].vj , then we construct a point (auc
i ,j ,2, t i ,j ,2) equiv-
alent to (auc, t) with respect to ∼i and satisfying the condition
auci ,j ,2.aS [t i ,j ,2].vj 6= auc.aS [t ].vj
from (auci ,j ,0, t i ,j ,0). If auc.aS [t ].vj 6= auc.aS [0].vj , then we construct such
a point from (auc, 0) itself as ∼i is reexive. Hence, we have the following
lemma.
Lemma 4.5.1 Let (auc, t) : AUC [M ,RS ]× N and i , j : B. Then
(K(M ,RS ), auc, 0)  ¬ Ki(vj )
implies that
(K(M ,RS ), auc, t)  ¬ Ki(vj )U¬ pre SealBidi .
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(The index i in SealBidi means that the operation is to be run by bidder i).
As above, assume that #auc.aS [t ].Va,j = 1. If auc.aS [t ].Va,j = auc.aS [0].Va,j ,
then there exists (auci ,j ,1, t i ,j ,1) : AUC [(M ,RS )] × N equivalent to (auc, 0)
with respect to ∼i such that
auci ,j ,1.aS [t i ,j ,1].Va,j 6= auc.aS [0].Va,j .
We can construct a point (auci ,j ,2, t i ,j ,2) equivalent to (auc, t) with respect to
∼i and satisfying
auci ,j ,2.aS [t i ,j ,2].Va,j 6= auc.aS [t ].Va,j
from (auci ,j ,1, t i ,j ,1). If auc.aS [t ].Va,j 6= auc.aS [0].Va,j , then we construct such
a point from (auc, 0) (again following reexivity of ∼i). Therefore, we also
have the subsequent lemma.
Lemma 4.5.2 Let (auc, t) : AUC [M ,RS ]× N and i , j : B. Then
(K(M ,RS ), auc, 0)  (Ki(Va,j )⇒ #Va,j > 1)
implies that
(K(M ,RS ), auc, t)  (Ki(Va,j )⇒ #Va,j > 1)U¬ pre SealBidi .
Combining Lemma 4.5.1 and Lemma 4.5.2, we can infer that a sealed-bid
auction auc : AUC [(M ,RS )] preserves independence during the committing
time.
Proposition 4.5.3 Let (auc, t) : AUC [M ,RS ]× N and i , j : B. Then,
(K(M ,RS ), auc, 0)  iIj
implies that
(K(M ,RS ), auc, t)  iIjU¬ pre SealBidi .
4.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have presented a way to distribute sealed-bid auctions.
Our approach eliminates the need for some trusted entities to compute the
outcome, provided that each bidder has the computational power to do so and
that broadcasts are successful. As discussed in Section 3.6, the mechanism can
be chosen to be relatively simple depending on the purpose of the auction.
Assuming that the system is synchronous and that each phase consists of one
round, the protocol needs 3 rounds to collect the bids and to compute the
outcome. To make one bid in that case, a bidder needs to send 2b messages.
We have established that our set of bid collection rules for these auctions pre-
serves independence of the bidders during bidding time. Hence, it is compatible
with the mechanisms we discussed in Section 3.5. Particularly, it is compatible
with the single item mechanismM2 which gives the distributed SBSP auctions.
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Application to Tie Breaking
Assuming no ties for our examples so far has allowed us to focus on the rules
of auction games. However, as ties might occur, we need to provide a viable
solution to break them in the auction game's setting. The protocol we present
in this chapter generalizes coin-tossing through an application of distributed
sealed-bid auctions. This way, we stay in the setting of auction games.
Besides, as there is no centralized processor to start it, the protocol in question
here is a solution to the Leader Election Problem [10] on its own.
In Section 5.1, we exploit distributed sealed-bid auctions to produce a protocol
for tie breaking and in the remaining sections, we analyse its eciency.
5.1 Valuation Space and Mechanism
To elucidate the protocol, let us consider the case of two players.
As mentioned above, we do not have a centralized processor to start the pro-
tocol. Hence, we need to treat the two players equally. We must choose a
sequence of actions that they both perform on their respective sides and a
symmetric way of determining the winner. For instance, we may let them
both ip a coin (choose 0 or 1 at random) and communicate the results to
each other. The issue is that we cannot use deterministic functions like max
or min to decide who wins, otherwise the players would have an incentive to
not choose randomly.
The hint is Blum's protocol for Coin-Flipping by Telephone as presented in
[9]. It consists of letting player i ip a coin and commit the result to j
who then guesses what it was before i reveals it. Bidder j wins if and only
if j guesses correctly. Although in Blum's protocol, the players' roles are
assumed to be established (which exactly is our problem), we can adapt this
idea of guessing the other's coin into our symmetric setting.
Instead of tossing a coin once, each player does so twice: once for his fate
and the other as his guess. If one player guessed correctly and the other did
not, then the latter loses. Conversely, if a player loses, then the other player
39
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correctly guessed his rst number. Of course it is possible that none or both
has/have the right guess but a simple tree of conditional probabilities would
show us that we have a winner with probability 0.5.
Generally, assume we have a set W of winners and let w := #W ≥ 2. Every
player i ∈ W independently chooses a rst number Xi : [0,w) for his fate
and a second number Yi ∈ [0,w) as his guess. Assume he chooses each of
these with equiprobability.
During the appropriate time, each player i commits then reveals the two num-
bers Xi and Yi to the others. In terms of auctions, let us say that the bidders
(players in W ) bid for two items I and J in the sealed-bid form. Bidder i 's
values for I and J are then respectively Xi and Yi which he obtained from
random variables following a uniform distribution on [0,w) (just as discussed
in Section 2.2).
As described in Section 4.1, sealing the bids involves use of a one-way function
from the set F of valuations to a certain space E . However, as the bidders
obtain these functions from the same messages containing the sealed bid, try-
ing w 2 possible valuations would not take long for small w : N. Therefore, we
consider
F := {I , J} → [0,w)
with [0,w) an interval of R≥0 (in practice, oating-point numbers) instead of
N. With a valuation prole
v : W → F
i 7→ vi ,
we have Xi = bvi(I )c and Yi = bvi(J )c for all i : W .
Recall that the mechanism of an auction is a function used to compute the
result. It is dened on the valuation space V and its values in OUTCOME are
composed by a feasible allocation prole in A and a price prole in W → R≥0.
Here, we assume the price prole to be the constant function λ i : W • 0.
In Section 2.2, we referred to the choices for which the bidders bid as items
and we mentioned that they do not need to be physical. Also, we did not give
an explicit condition for A and required it only to be a subset of W → I⊥.
Therefore, we may allow ourselves to think of I and J to mean In and Out
respectively. A bidder i 's value for In(Xi) makes him stay In the winning
position if none of his opponents has the same value for Out (Yj , j 6= i).
Writing I = 1 and J = 0, an allocation prole A : A is a function on W which
takes its values in B determining whether or not the corresponding player
wins. Therefore, we have a mechanism M T : V → OUTCOME such that for
all v : V , M T (v).p = 0 and
M T (v).A : W → B
i 7→ (bvi(1)c 6∈ {bvj (0)c | j 6= i}).
Together with the rulesRS , we have a sealed-bid auction formAUC [(M T ,RS )].
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5.2 Sequence of Sealed-Bid Auctions
From its denition, the allocation prole in the mechanism M T may yield any
number of players (might be none or all) remaining in their winning positions.
If the goal is to obtain a certain number a : N of winners with 1 ≤ a < w ,
then we need to run another tie breaking in case #(M T (v).A)−1({1}) 6= a.
There are two cases.
 Firstly, if #(M T (v).A)−1({1}) < a then the w − #(M T (v).A)−1({1})
losers play again to ll the a −#(M T (v).A)−1({1}) remaining places.
 Secondly, if #(M T (v).A)−1({1}) > a then these #(M T (v).A)−1({1})
winners play for the a winning positions.
In short, we might need a sequence of sealed-bid auctions with dierent num-
bers of players and dierent numbers of prizes to totally break ties.
Representing the state of a tie by the numbers w : N and a : N of players and
available prizes respectively, a should always be strictly smaller than w unless




(0 < a ∧ a < w) ∨ (w = 0 ∧ a = 0)
Therefore, each sealed-bid auction in the aforementioned sequence consists of
a given state s : TState with s .a > 0 and s .w > s .a and some state s ′ : TState
such that s ′.a ∈ (0, s .a] and s ′.w ∈ (s ′.a, s .w ] or s ′ = 0 where 0 is the special
state meaning no tie. Note that what completely determines the state s ′ is the
valuation prole v formed in the auction as explained in Section 4.2. More-
over, as mentioned in Section 5.1, each component of the valuation prole in
such an auction is assumed to be uniformly chosen from [0, s .w).
We can think of these particular sealed-bid auctions as points in the graph of
a function τ mapping a state s : TState to a distribution over TState ([25],
although in this paper the state space is assumed to be nite). Denote by
TState the set of distributions over TState.
Note that τ(0)(0) = 1 which means that for any state s ′ : TState \ {0},
τ(0)(s ′) = 0.
Given a state s : TState \ {0}, we compute τ(s) in the following. For sim-
plicity, we write w and a for s .w and s .a respectively when the context is clear.
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5.3 Probability for #(M T (v ).A)−1({1})
Consider the auction form AUC [(M T ,RS )] designed for w bidders who choose
their bids for the items I and J with equiprobability. Let
f : V → [0,w ]
v 7→ f (v) = #(M T (v).A)−1({1}).
Following Section 5.2, the state s ′ as a result of an auction auc : AUC [(M T ,RS )]
is determined by the valuation prole v in that auction. More precisely, it is
determined by the number f (v) with a. Hence, we can rst work on the prob-
ability distribution on [0,w ] for f (v) and return back to τ(s) at the end of
Section 5.5.
Recall that writing Xi = bvi(1)c and Yi = bvi(0)c, we have
M T (v).A : W → B
i 7→ (Xi 6∈ {Yi | j 6= i}).
Given Y = (Y0, · · · ,Yw−1) ∈ [0,w)w , there are w −#{Yj | j 6= i} choices for
Xi 6∈ {Yj | j 6= i}. Therefore, the conditional probability of Xi 6∈ {Yj | j 6= i}
given Y is:
Pi |Y =
w −#{Yj | j 6= i}
w
. (5.3.1)
Hence, the probability that the cardinality f (v) = w ′ ∈ [0,w ] is:
P (f (v) = w ′)
= from the Rule of Conditional Probability∑
Y∈[0,w)w P (f (v) = w
′ | Y )P(Y )










j∈[0,w)\A(1− Pj |Y )
)
= factorizing the 1
w











(w −#{Yk | k 6= i})
) ∏
j∈[0,w)\A
(#{Yk | k 6= j})
 .
Note that each set A in the expansion of P (f (v) = w ′ | Y ) corresponds to a
possible allocation in A, hence the notation.
Using this denition of P(f (v) = w ′), we can obtain an expression for τ(s)(s ′)
for all s ′ : TState. Nevertheless, the two enumerations (Y : [0,w)w and
A ⊆ [0,w)) in this formula mystify the behaviour of τ(s). Fortunately, they
can be signicantly reduced as we shall see in the next two sections.
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5.4 Independent of the set A
Note that we have two independent summations in the last expression for
P(f (v) = w ′) given in Section 5.3. Hence by changing the summation order,
we also have:








Observe that if A0 and A1 are subsets of [0,w) that are of the same size and
Y 0 : [0,w)w is a permutation of Y 1 : [0,w)w such that the components of Y 1
at coordinates in A1 are exactly the components of Y 0 at coordinates in A0,
then the pairs (A0,Y 0) and (A1,Y 1) have the same image by g . We formally
prove this in the following lemma.
Lemma 5.4.1 Let σ : [0,w) → [o,w) be a bijection. Then, there exists a
bijection ϕσ on [0,w)
w such that for all Y ∈ [0,w)w and for all A ⊆ [0,w)
with #A = w ′, we have:




Y 7→ ϕσ(Y ) = (Yσ(0), · · · ,Yσ(w−1)).
Let Y ∈ [0,w)w and A ⊆ [0,w). Then,
g(σ−1(A), ϕσ(Y ))
= by the denition of g∏
i∈σ−1(A)(w −#{ϕσ(Y )k | k 6= i})
∏
j∈[0,w)\σ−1(A)(#{ϕσ(Y )k | k 6= j})
= by the denition of ϕσ∏
i∈σ−1(A)(w −#{Yσ(k) | σ(k) 6= σ(i)})
∏
j∈[0,w)\σ−1(A)(#{Yσ(k) | σ(k) 6= σ(j )})
= since σ is a bijection∏
i∈A(w −#{Yk | k 6= i})
∏
j∈[0,w)\A(#{Yk | k 6= j})
= by the denition of g ,
g(A,Y ).

As a corollary to Lemma 5.4.1, the following proposition shows that the inner
most summation in Equation (5.4.1) is constant on A.
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Proposition 5.4.2 Let A0 = [0,w






Proof : For all A ⊆ [0,w) with #A = w ′, there exists a bijection
σ : [0,w)→ [0,w)
such that σ(A) = A0. The result follows from Lemma 5.4.1.

It follows from Proposition 5.4.2 that











(w −#{Yk | k 6= i})
w−1∏
j=w ′
(#{Yk | k 6= j})
)
.
Remark 5.4.3 Distributing the binomial coecient to the terms in the sum-
mation does not give the conditional probability of f (v) = w ′ given Y . For













From now on, g(Y ) denotes g(A0,Y ) for all Y ∈ [0,w)w .
5.5 Equivalence Relation on [0,w )2
We now reduce the summation over [0,w)2 through an equivalence relation.
The following lemma tells us which one to consider.
Lemma 5.5.1 Let σ : [0,w)→ [0,w) be a bijection and dene:
ψσ : [0,w)
w → [0,w)w
Y 7→ ψσ(Y ) = (σ(Y0), · · · , σ(Yw−1)).
Then, g(Y ) = g(ψσ(Y )) for all Y ∈ [0,w)w .
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Proof : For all i ∈ [0,w),
#{Yk | k 6= i} = #{σ(Yk) | k 6= i} = #{ψσ(Y )k | k 6= i}.

Lemma 5.5.1 simply says that the image of Y by g does not depend on the
representation of its components. Hence, if Y 0 and Y 1 are such that whenever
we nd the same element at two coordinates in Y 0, we do so at these two
coordinates in Y 1, then Y 0 and Y 1 are equivalent with regard to their image
by g . Dene the equivalence relation
v := {(Y 0,Y 1) ∈ [0,w)2w | ∃σ : [0,w)→ [0,w) • Y 1 = ψσ(Y 0)}
on [0,w)w . Indeed, v is reexive (take id[0,w)), symmetric (take σ−1) and
transitive (take the composition).
Let Y 0 ∈ [0,w)w . Then, every injection of {Y 0k | k ∈ [0,w)} into [0,w)
corresponds to a unique
Y 1 ∈ [Y 0] := {Y 2 ∈ [0,w)w | Y 0 v Y 2}.
Therefore, the equivalence class [Y 0] ∈ [0,w)w/ v, represented by its element






Besides, any Y 0 and Y 1 ∈ [0,w)w such that
#{Y 0k | k ∈ [0,w)} 6= #{Y 1k | k ∈ [0,w)}
are not equivalent. Therefore, we can label the classes by the common cardi-
nality
#{Yk | k ∈ [0,w)} = n ∈ [1,w ]
of their elements. Moreover, we know that each class which has the label n
corresponds to a unique mapping of [0,w) onto [0, n), which means to a unique
partition of [0,w) into n parts. (Hence, there are S(w , n), with S the Stirling
number of the second kind, classes in the group [26]).
It follows that
P (f (v) = w ′)















[Y ]∈[0,w)w/v#[Y ]g(Y )
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(w − (n − 1 + µ(E )))#{x∈E |x<w ′}(n − 1 + µ(E ))#{x∈E |x≥w ′}
with µ(E ) = 0 if #E = 1 and µ(E ) = 1 otherwise.
Now, observe that ĝ(P) does not depend on the actual elements of [0,w) in
each part E ∈ P . It rather depends on two numbers:
ρ1 = #{x ∈ [0,w) | ∃E ∈ P • #E > 1 ∧ x ∈ E ∧ x < w ′}, (5.5.1)
ρ2 = #{x ∈ [0,w) | ∃E ∈ P • #E > 1 ∧ x ∈ E ∧ x ≥ w ′}. (5.5.2)
Fixed n ∈ [1,w), ρ1 ≤ w ′ and ρ2 ≤ w − w ′, a P ∈ Part(w , n) that satises




(w − (n − 1 + µ(E )))#{x∈E |x<w ′}(n − 1 + µ(E ))#{x∈E |x≥w ′}
= (w − n + 1)w ′−ρ1(w − n)ρ1(n − 1)w−w ′−ρ2nρ2
=: h(ρ1, ρ1 + ρ2,w , n).




w − w ′
ρ2
)
S∗(ρ1 + ρ2, n − w + ρ1 + ρ2),
where S∗(ρ1 + ρ2, n − w + ρ1 + ρ2) is the number of ways to distribute the
ρ1 + ρ2 elements into n − w + ρ1 + ρ2 subsets of cardinality > 1.
Before we can make use of that observation, let us examine the domains of ρ1
and ρ2. Firstly, we already know that
0 ≤ ρ1 ≤ w ′ and 0 ≤ ρ2 ≤ w − w ′.
Secondly, since each of the n − w + ρ1 + ρ2 must have at least two elements,







≤ w − n.
In addition, since the number of singletons must be strictly smaller than the
size n < w of the partition, we have w − ρ1 − ρ2 < n. Hence
w − n < ρ1 + ρ2 ≤ min(w , 2(w − n)),
for n ∈ [1,w). By considering the sum ρ := ρ1 + ρ2, we have
0 ≤ ρ− ρ1 ≤ w − w ′,
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which means
w ′ − w + ρ ≤ ρ1 ≤ ρ,
and obtain the domains of ρ, ρ1:
w − n + 1 ≤ ρ ≤ min(w , 2(w − n))
and
max (0,w ′ − w + ρ) ≤ ρ1 ≤ min(ρ,w ′),
for n ∈ [1,w).
Since there is only one partition of [0,w) into w parts, namely the one with n
singletons, the probability P (f (v) = w ′) becomes




















w − w ′
ρ− ρ1
)
S∗(ρ, n − w + ρ)h(ρ1, ρ,w , n)
 .
Following [26], the class S(C ,N ) of set partitions with block sizes in C and
number of blocks in N has the generating function













Therefore, by taking C = [2,∞) and N = {n − w + ρ}, we can compute
S∗(ρ, n − w + ρ) using the generating function:
S(z ) = (e
z − 1− z )n−w+ρ
(n − w + ρ)!
.
To summarize, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 5.5.2 Let w : N be the number of bidders and let w ′ : [0,w ].
Then, the probability that the chosen valuation prole v is such that M T allo-
cates 1 to w ′ players, is given by




















w − w ′
ρ− ρ1
)
S∗(ρ, n − w + ρ)h(ρ1, ρ,w , n)
 ,
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where
h(ρ1, ρ,w , n) := (w − n + 1)w
′−ρ1(w − n)ρ1(n − 1)w−w ′−ρ+ρ1nρ−ρ1 ,
and




(ez − 1− z )n−w+ρ
(n − w + ρ)!
)
.
Coming back to the distribution τ(s), consider a state s ′ : TState.
If s ′.a > s .a, then it is clear that τ(s)(s ′) = 0. If s ′ = 0, it means that the
allocation prole yielded exactly s .a winning bidders. Hence,
τ(s)(0) = P(f (v) = s .a).
Now, following the two cases explained in Section 5.2, s ′.a ∈ (0, s .a) means
that the cardinality f (v) ∈ (0, s .a) and the number of players left for the next
auction is s ′.w = s .w − f (v). In that case, we have
τ(s)(s ′) = P(f (v) = s .w − s ′.w).
If s ′.a = s .a, then either f (v) = 0 (which implies s ′.w = s .w) or f (v) > s .a.
Hence in this case, if s ′.w = s .w , then
τ(s)(s ′) = P(f (v) = 0) + P(f (v) = s .w)
and if s ′.w < s .w , then
τ(s)(s ′) = P(f (v) = s ′.w).
5.6 Tie Breaking for a Single Prize
Suppose that there is only one prize (s .a = 1) and let s ′ : TState. Then
τ(s)(s ′) =

P(f (v) = 1) if s ′ = 0
P(f (v) = s ′.w) if s ′.a = 1 ∧ s ′.w < s .w
P(f (v) = 0) + P(f (v) = s .w) if s ′.a = 1 ∧ s ′.w = s .w
0 otherwise.
Using the formula presented in Proposition 5.5.2, we obtain the distributions
plotted in Figure 5.1 as examples. Each curve shows the image by τ of some
state s : TState with s .a = 1, restricted on {s : TState | s .a ≤ 1} since outside
this domain, τ(s) is constant equal to zero.
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Figure 5.1: Horizontal axis s ′.w , vertical axis τ(s)(s ′) for s.a = 1 and s.w =
2, 14, 26, 38.
As mentioned in Section 5.2, we run the program τ until the state 0 is
reached. By using the weakest precondition wp.(h o9 h
′).β for h, h : HS as
dened in [25] with S = TState and β := (s = 0), or by building a stochastic
matrix with τ(s)(s ′), we can work on the probability for reaching 0 after
k iterations. As shown in Figure 5.2, this probability increases with k : N∗.
Moreover, the number s .w of players in the initial state s does not signicantly
aect its convergence to 1. In Figure 5.2, we see that the ties are broken with
high probability after only 6 iterations, even for s .w = 38.
Figure 5.2: Horizontal axis the number k of iterations, vertical axis τ k (s)(0) for
s.a = 1 and s.w = 2, 14, 26, 38.
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 5. APPLICATION TO TIE BREAKING 50
5.7 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have presented a mechanism for tie breaking which we have
used with the bid collection rules RS for distributed sealed-bid auctions. The
resulting tie-breaking protocol is symmetric so that it can be used for Leader
Election without a specic network topology (unlike, for instance, Herman' s
Ring [11]).
We have given a simplied explicit formula for the probability distribution over
the state space which the protocol yields for a given initial state. We have seen
by means of simulations that the protocol breaks ties with high probability in
only few iterations, independently of the initial number of players, for a single
prize. As mentioned in Section 4.6, each iteration can be done in 3 rounds if
the system is synchronous. Also in each iteration, a player needs to send 2b
messages to make the only one required bid.
Since the players may leave the competition in dierent iterations and the
winner is one of those who stays until the end, the number of messages a




In this document, we have presented a framework which allows studies of auc-
tion mechanisms to be centralized (Chapter 2). We have studied two mech-
anism spaces for compact (with respect to a metric, given in that chapter)
and convex valuation spaces and gave some of their properties (Chapter 3).
The results we have obtained exposed the relative simplicity of some truthful
mechanisms.
We have shown how to distribute a sealed-bid auction in a way that auctioneers
are not needed as every participant can compute the outcome independently
(Chapter 4). We have gained that independence by forfeiting the privacy of
bids at the end of the auction (which as mentioned in Chapter 1, is the focus of
[12] and [13]). However, from Proposition 4.5.3, the bidders don't know each
others' bids until they no longer can bid and the bids can be made anonymous.
Finally, we have proposed a tie-breaking mechanism for distributed sealed-bid
auctions which, as a protocol, can also be used for Leader Election without
a specic network topology (Chapter 5). We have given an explicit formula
for the probability distribution over the state space, which the protocol yields
for a given initial state. Nevertheless, an average case analysis of the protocol
should be part of a future work.
Besides, it would be interesting to study Nash Equilibrium mechanisms the
same way as for Mu(V). Also an in-depth analysis of distributed English
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